United States District Comt, E. D. 2lfissouri.

UNITED STATES v. BAYLE.
A postal card, on which is written a demand for a debt, coupled with a
threat to place the account with a lawyer or law agency for collection, is
non-mailable matter under the provisions of the Act of Congress of September 26, 1888.
But a demand for a debt, stating that it is long past due and that the
creditor's collector has called for it several times, may be written upon a
postal card, if couched in respectful language, and not put in such form
as to attract public notice or make it offensive to the person addressed,
and such postal card will not fall within the statutory prohibition.

On demurrer to an indictment under Section One of the
Act of September 26, 1888 [25 Stat. at Large 496], which

providesBe it enacted, etc., That the last clause of the second section of "An
Act relating to postal crimes, and amendatory of the statutes therein
mentioned, "approved June 18, 1888 [25 Stat. at Large 187], be, and the
same is hereby, so amended, as to read as follows, and to constitute the
third section of said Act.
SEC. 3. That all matter otherwise mailable by law, upon the envelope
or outside cover or wrapper of which, or any postal card upon which, any
delineations, epithets, terms or language of an indecent, lewd, lascivious, obscene, libelous, scurrilous, defamatory, or threatening character, or
calculaied by the terms or manner or style of display and obviously intended to reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of another
may be written or printed, or otherwise impressed or apparent, are hereby
declared non-mailable matter, and shall not be conveyed in the mails, nor
delivered from any post-office nor by any letter carrier, and shall be withdrawn from the mails under such regulations as the Postmaster-General
shall prescribe; and any person who shall knowingly deposit, or cause to
be deposited for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to
be non-mailable matter, and any person who shall knowingly take the
same or cause the same to be taken from the mails, for the purpose of circulating or disposing of, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition of
the same, shall, for each and every offense, upon conviction thereof, be
fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned at hard labor not
more than five years, or both, at the discretion of the court.

George D. Reynolds, U. S. District Attorney.
D. P. Dyer, for defendant.

December 14, 1889. This is an indictment
in three counts, under the Act of September 26, 1888 (25
St. U. S- 496), for depositing postal cards of an alleged nonTHAY R,
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mailable character in the mails. The postal cards in question were each addressed to John Greb, 22O Franklin
avenue, St. Louis, and are of the following tenor'ST. Louis, April 12th, 1889.
"Please call and settle account, which is long past due, and for which
our collector has called several times, and oblige,
ST. Louis PIR-ziEL CO."
"Respectfully,
"ST. Louis, April i8th, 1889.
"You owe us $i.8o. We have called several times for same. If not
paid at once, we shall place same with our law agency for collection.
ST. Louis PRETZEL CO."
"Respectfully,
"ST. Louis, May Ist, 1889.
"You owe us Si.8o, long past due. We have called several times for
the amount. If it is not paid at once, we shall place same with our lawyer for collection.
ST. LouIs Pa TzEI Co."
"Respectfully,

Section One of the Act of September 26, 1888, provides:
[here follows a quotation of the first half of the section, to
the words "not be conveyed in the mails."]
If the postal cards in question are non-mailable, it is
because they contain language of a "threatening character,"
within the meaning of the law, or because they contain
language "calculated * * * and obviously intended to
reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct" of the person to whom they were addressed. It is clear that they fall
within no clause of the statute unless they are within the
clauses last referred to. Two of the cards, as it will be observed, contain a demand for the payment of money alleged
to be due, and a threat to place the demand in the handp of
a lawyer for collection, if not paid at once. The question,
therefore, arises whether Congress intended to prohibit the
mailing of postal cards containing or on which are written
threats of that kind. The language of the statute is very
general, and certainly may be construed as a prohibition
against mailing postal cards which contain threats to bring
suits if debts are not paid, as well as being a prohibition
against mailing cards containing threats of personal violence
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or threats of any other character. It is most probable, I
think, that Congress intended the Act should receive that
construction.
It is a well-known fact that prior to the Passage of the law
some persons had made a practice of enforcing the payment
of debts by mailing postal cards or letters bearing offensive,
threatening, or abusive matter, which was open to the inspection of all persons through whose hands such postal
cards or letters happened to pass. In some quarters the
practice alluded to of sending communications through the
mail that were both calculated and intended to humiliate,
and injure the persons addressed in public estimation, had
become one of the recognized methods of compelling the
payment of debts. Congress evidently intended by the Act
of September 26, i888, to utterly suppress the practice in
question. It has not only declared that libelous, scurrilous,
and defamatory matter written on postal cards, or on envelopes containing letters, shall not be disseminated through
the mails, but that no matter of a "threatening character,"
or that is even "calculated * * * and * * * intended to reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct,"
shall be so disseminated, if written on postal-cards, or on the
envelopes of letters, and hence is open to public inspection.
I conclude that a postal card on which is written a demand
for the payment of a debt, and a threat to sue, or to place
the demand in the hand of a lawyer for suit, if the debt is
not paid, is now non-mailable matter. Henceforth persons
writing such demands and threats must inclose them in sealed
envelopes, or subject themselves to criminal prosecution.
The demurrer to the second and third counts is not well
taken, and is therefore overruled as to those counts.
The language employed in the postal card described in the
first count is not of a threatening character, and, in my
opinion, no jury would be warranted in finding, in view of
its contents, that it was obviously intended by the writer to
reflect injuriously on the character or conduct of the person
addressed, or to injure or degrade him in the eyes of the
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public. It is true that it contains a demand for the payment
of a debt, and says it is long past due, and that a collector
has called several times; but it is couched in respectful
terms, and no intent is apparent to put it in such form as to
attract public notice, or to make it offensive to the person
addressed. Congress has not declared that postal-cards shall
not be used to make such demands, and a construction of
the Act ought not to be adopted that will unnecessarily restrict their use for business purposes. The card in question
cannot be held to be non-mailable, without being overcritical
and extremely punctilious in the choice of language which
men may lawfully use in their daily transactions. The
demurrer is accordingly sustained as to the first count. •
The Act of Congress of June i8,
i888 (25 U. S. Stat. at Large, ch.
394, sec. 2), provided that "all
matter otherwise mailable by law
upon the envelope or outside cover
or wrapper of which, or postal card,
upon which indecent, lewd, lascivious,obscene, libelous, scurrilous, or
threatening delineations, epithets,
terms, or language, or reflecting injuriously upon the character or conduct of another, may be written or
printed, are hereby declared to be
non-mailable matter, and shall not
be conveyed in the mails, nor be
delivered from any post-office nor
by any letter-carrier ; and any person who shall knowingly deposit,
or cause to be deposited, for mailing or delivery anything declared
by this section to be non-mailable
matter, and any person who shall
knowingly take the same or cause
the same to be taken from the mails,
for the purpose of circulating or
disposing of or of aiding in the circulation or disposition of the same,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, for each and
every offense, be fined not less than
$ioo, nor more than $5ooo, or im-

prisoned at hard labor not less
than one year nor more than ten
years, or both, at the discretion of
the court."
The same Congress, by Act of
September 26, 1888 (25 U. S. Stat.
at Large, ch. io39, sec. 2), under
which the indictment in the principal case was framed, amended the
Act ofJune 18, i888, by adding to
the adjectives used in the latter
Act as descriptive of the delineations
epithets, terms or language which
would render unmailable the matter upon which they appeared, the
word "defamatory," by substituting for the words "reflecting injuriously" the following: "calculated by the terms or manner or
style of display, and obviously intended, to reflect injuriously," and
by inserting after the words "written or printed," the words " cr
otherwise impressed or apparent."
The intention of the Act of Septemiber 26, 1888, was evidently to lay
down a more stringent rule and to
close up some loop-holes which had
been discovered in the more general terms of the earlier Act, through
which offenders might find means
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-of escape. At the same time the
-punishment prescribed by the June
Act was reduced by that of Septem"ber to a fine of not more than $5o0o,
-or imprisonment for not more than
five years, or both, and no minimum
penalty was fixed.
In U. S. v. Barber (U. S. C. Ct.,
.'D. Neb., 1888) 37 Fed. Repr. 55, it
was held by DuNDY, J., that the
Act ofJune 18 was repealed by that
of September 26, and that a conviction under the former Act for an of"fense committed between the two
,dates, could not be sustained. This
7legislation, the Court adds in its
-opinion, "seems to have gone
further than Congress has ever before ventured in that direction.
!New offenses have been created, and
mew penalties have been prescribed
for old offenses."
In U. S. v, Smilk (U. S. C. Ct.,
D. Ky., 1882), iI Fed. Repr. 664,
the legislation of Congress upon the
subject of non-mailable matter is
"The first
reviewed as follows:
Act upon this subject was approved
March 3, 1865, and in that Act the
language was 'no obscene book,
pamphlet, picture, paper, writing,
print, or other publication of a
vulgar and indecent character.'
The next Act was approved June 8,
1872, andprovided that ' no obscene
!ook, &c., or other publication of
a vulgar or indecent character, or
any letter upon the envelope of
-which, or postal card, upon which,
scurriloiis epithets may have been
written or printed, or disloyal de-vices printed or engraved, shall be
carried in the mail.' The next Act
was March 3, 1873, and that provided 'no obscene, lewd, or lascivious
book, &c., or other publication of
anindecentcharacter * * * norany
-written or printed card, circular
* * * upon which scurrilous

epithets may be * * * shall be
carried in the mails. Section 3893
of the Revised Statutes provided
that envelopes and postal cards
upon which 'indecent or scurrilous
epithets are written or printed
should be non-mailable.' It will
be noticed, from this review of the
legislation of Congress, that the
Act of 1873 omitted the words ' disloyal devices,' which were in the
Act of 1872, but retained the word
' scurrilous,' which was used in the
Revised Statutes, but that the Act
of 1876 omitted the word ' scurrilous'
and the law is now substantially as
originally enacted in 1865." This
Act ofJuly 12, 1876, which excluded from the mails envelopes and
postal cards "upon which indecent,
lewd, obscene, or lascivious delineations, epithets, terms or language,
may be written or printed," remained unchanged until the amendatory Acts of 1888, which have
been cited at the beginning of this
annotation.
The constitutional power of Congress to designate what shall be
carried in the mail and what excluded, has been expressly affirmed
by the Supreme Court in Ex Pare
Jackson (1877), 96 U. S. 727; S. C.
17 AmERIcAN LAw REGISTER, 596,
a case arising under U. S. Rev.
Stat. Sect. 3894, and the amendatory Act of July 12, 1876 (ig Stat. at
Large, 9o), which forbid the carrying in the mails of any "letter or
circular concerning lotteries, socalled gift concerts, or other similar
enterprises offering prizes." Mr.
Justice F=ILD there says: "The
power vested in Congress 'to establish post-offices and post-roads,
has been practically construed since
the foundation of the government,
to authorize not merely the designation of the routes over which
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the mail shall be carried, and the
offices where letters and other documents shall be received to be distributed or forwarded, but the
carriage of the mail, and all measures necessary to secure its safe and
speedy transit, and the prompt delivery ofits contents. The validity
of legislation prescribing what
should be carried, and its weight
and form, and the charges to which
it should be subjected, has never
been questioned. What should be
mailable has varied at different
times, changing with the facility of
transportation over the post-roads.
At one time, only letters, newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and
other printed matter, not exceeding
a prescribed weight, as well as books
and printed matter of all kinds, are
transported in the mail. The power
possessed by Congress embraces the
regulation of the entire postal system of the country. The right to
designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be excluded. The
difficulty attending the subject
arises, not from the want of power
in Congress to prescribe regulations
as to whatshal1 constitute mail matter, but from the necessity of enforcing them consistently with
rights reserved to the people, of far
greater importance than the transportation of the mail. In their enforcement, a distinction is to be
made between different kinds of
mail matter, between what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and sealed
packages subject to letter postage;
and what is open to inspection,
such as newspapers, magazines,
pamphlets and other printed matter
purposely left in a condition to
be examined. Letters and sealed
packages of this kind in the mail

are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to
their outward form and weight, as
if they were retained by the parties
forwarding them in their own
domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people tobe
secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed
against inspection, wherever they
may be. Whilst in the mail, they
can only be opened and examined
under like warrant, issued upon
similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be
seized, as is required when papers
are subjected to search in one's own
household. No law of Congress
can place in the hands of officials
connected with the postal service
any authority to invade the secrecy
of letters and such sealed packages
in the mail; and all regulations
adopted as to mail matter of this
kind must be in subordination to
the great principle embodied in the
fourth amendment of the Constitution * * * Whilst regulations excluding matter from the mail cannot be enforced in a way which
would require or permit an examination into letters, or sealed packages subject to letter postage, without warrant, issued upon oath or
affirmation, in the search for prohibited matter, they may be enforced upon competent evidence
of their violation obtained in other
ways; as from the parties receiving
the letters or packages, or from
agents depositing them in the postoffice, or others cognizant of the
facts. And as to objectionable
printed matter, which is open to
examination, the regulations may
be enforced in a similar way, by
the imposition of penalties fortheir
violation through the courts, and, in
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some cases, by the direct action of
the officers of the postal service.
* * * In excluding various articles
from the mail, the object of Congress has not been to interfere with
the freedom of the press, or with
any other rights of the people; but
to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious
to the public morals. * * * All that
Congress meant by this Act [Act of
March 3, 1873] was, that the mail
should not be used to tranport such
corrupting publications and articles,
and that any one who attempted to
use it for that purpose should be
punished. The same inhibition
has been extended to circulars concerning lotteries, institutions which
are supposed to have a demoralizing influence upon the people.
There is no question before us as
to the evidence upon which the
conviction ofthe petitioner was had;
nor does it appear whether the
envelope in which the prohibited
circular was deposited in the mail
was sealed or left open for examination. The only question for our
determination relates to the constitutionality of the Act; and of that
we have no doubt."
In U. S. v. Bennett (U. S. C. Ct.,
S. D. N. Y., 1879), i6 Blatch. 338,
the constitutionality of the Acts of
Congress declaring unmailable "obscene, lewd or lascivious" matter,
was called in question, butJustice
BLATCHFORD, then Circuit Judge,
held that the question had been
"definitely settled by the decision
of the Supreme Court in Exparte
Jackson," supra. "Thatdecision,"
the Court said, "related to a statute excluding from the mails letters
and circulars concerning lotteries,
but the views of the Court apply
fully to the present case." The
same views apply with equal apt-

ness to the Acts of Congress nowunder discussion. There can be no
doubt as to their constitutionality.
The main questions that will arise
under this legislation will be as to
what "delineations, epithets, terms
or language" fall within the statutory prohibition. The descriptive
words used in the Act of September 26, 1888, are as follows: "of an
indecent, lewd, lascivious, obscene,
libelous, scurrilous, defamatory, or
threatening character, or calculated
by the terms or manner or style of
display and obviously intended to
reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of another." The
meanings of the adjectives "indecent," "lewd," "lascivious" and
"obscene," were well settled, prior
to 1888, in numerons prosecutions.
under the postal laws then in force.
In U. S. v. Bennett, supra, JudgeBLTcmsoRD held, after a careful
and thorough consideration of the
meaning of these words, that thetest within the meaning of thestatute is, "whether the tendency
of the matter is to deprave and corrupt the morals of those whose:
minds are open to such influences,
and into whose hands a publicationof this sort may fall." This case
has been generally accepted as a.
correct interpretation of the statutory language, and the test laid
down has been frequently applied
by other courts: U. S. v. Britton
(Commissioner's Ct., S. D. Ohio,
1883), 17 Fed. Repr. 731; U. S. v.
Bebout (U. S. D. Ct., N. D. Ohio,
I886), 28 Id. 522; U. S. v. Wightman (U. S. D. Ct., W. D. Pa., 1886),
29 Id. 636; U. S. v. Slenker (U. S.
D. Ct., W. D. Va., 1887), 32 Id.
691.

"ILibelous" is another word with
a long settled technical legal meaning, which it is unnecessary to con-
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has
"Defamatory"
-sidcr here.
.a.bo a settled meaning. "Words
which produce perceptible injury
to the reputation of another are
,describedas defamatory:" Anderso-'s Dict. of Law; Odgers on Libel and Slander, i. "By defamation is understood a false publication
-calculated to bring one into disrepute:" Cooley on Torts, 193. "Scurrilous," however, is a new word to
the law. It is defined in none of
the law dictionaries, nbr in any
reported case. It was originally
-used, as already stated, in the
Acts of Congress of June 8, 1872,
and March 3, 1873, and in the Revised Statutes, but was omitted
from the Act of July 12, 1876.
'Webster defines scurrilous as "containing low indecency or abuse;
mean; foul; vile; obscenely jocular." In U. S. v. Smith (U. S. C.
Ct., D. Ky., 1882), 11 Fed. Repr.
664, the words "d-d scoundrel
and rascal," are recognized as coming within this term. "Threatening," as used in these Acts, also
requires judicial definition. Anderson's Dict. of Law defines a
threat to be "a menace of destruction or injury to one's life, reputation or property." Whether any
threat whatever, however mild, if
'vritten upon an envelope or postal
,card, will render the writer liable
to the penalties prescribed by Congress, has not yet been decided. If
the language of the statute is to be
literally interpreted, this must be
the construction placed upon it.
In addition to these adjectives,
descriptive of non-mailable matter,
the prohibition is extended by the
Act to language, etc., calculated
and intended "to reflect injuri,ously upon the character or conThese broad
guct of another."
;ords seem to cover an immense

field, which was not reached bythe
earlier statutes. It was evidently
the intention of Congress to absolutely close the mails to all unsealed
matter which was not merely of a
character to offend the instincts of
propriety and decency, but which
was calculated in any way to bring
another person than the writer into
disrepute or lower him in the esteem of those before whose eyes
such matter might happen to come.
The truth of the allegations makes
no difference, nor does the Act confine the forbidden references to the
person addressed. Language relating to a third party is equally
within its penalties.
The Act under consideration is of
such recent date that there have as
yet been but few reported decisions
construing it.
In U. S. v. Olney (U. S. D. Ct.,
W. D. Tenn., 1889), 38 Fed. Repr.
328, the defendant wrote upon a
postal card as follows: "Mr. Editor:,I thought that you was publishing a paper for the wheel, but I
see nothing but rotten Democracy.
I am a Republican and a wheeler,
and you can take your paper and
Democracy, and go to hell -with
it." The Court declined to charge,
as a matter of law, that these
words were scurrilous within the
meaning of the Act, but left the
question to the jury, subsequently
sustaining a verdict of guilty.
In U. S. v. Davis ( U. S. C. Ct.,
W. D. Tenn., 1889), 38 Fed. Repr.
326, the exact language upon the
postal card is not contained in the
report of the case, but sufficiently
appears from the opinion of the
Ct. J.), which
Court (HA iMAON-D,
was as follows: "Since the extention by this Act of former statutes
on this subject, there can be no
doubt that that which is written on

-
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postal cards must be clean and decent, and wholly free from the objections embodied in the language
which has been quoted from the Act
of Congress. Of course the courts
must reasonably construe the words
of the Act, and not allow a hypercritical judgment to take advantage
of the elasticity of the language
used by Congress, necessarily so
general in its description of the offense, by bringing within the Act
words or thoughts thit are only
rude, impolite, or not in good taste
according to the standard of decency prescribed by the purists in
language and thought. But, on the
other hand, obvious indecency of
thought or expression, according to
the common sense, should not escape the penalty of this statute, nor
that which obviously is calculated
and intended to reflect injuriously
upon the character or conduct of
him who complains or is mentioned
in the writing. And not only may
the precise words be weighed in
determining the question, but the
whole context of the writing, and
its evident spirit and tone, as they
'display' the meaning of those
Words, may be looked to by the
court andjury. Inasmuch as the Act
does not include profane language
in its description of the offense,
except as it maybe embraced in the
other terms used by Congress, and
since in the common understanding
the word ' damned' is called ' profanity,' it may be doubted if the
use of thatword was intended to be
punished always. But this writer
says : 'You can order the car back,
and be damned.'
In connection
with the next phrase, which for
sake of decency I shall not quote,
although they have no dependence
upon each other, and in connection
with the whole writing in its tone

and spirit, it is both 'indecent' and
'scurrilous' in the sense of the
lexicographers, as well as the common understanding of its use. The
next phrase above referred to is so
vulgar as to admit of no doubt of
its indecency, and the writer knew
it to be so, and confessed by the
use of only an initial letter for the
most offensive word. If it be only
'slang,' still it is of that coarse,
gross and essentially vulgar kind,
that it cannot be placed upon a
postal card without offending all
sense of decency, even among the
commonest and coarsest of men,
and the use of all such phrases is
prohibited by this new Act of Congress. Again, the writer says:
'You are sharp, all of you are on
the beat.'
This, again, may be
'slang,' but it is calculated, and
obviously intended, to reflect injuriously upon the character and
conduct of the addressee. Finally,
he says: 'Tell that Radical to send
my book back as he agreed.' To
those familiar with the bitterness
of current political strife and its
evolution of distasteful epithets,
there will be no doubt that this one
was intended for opprobrium of a
severe kind, innocent as the epithet
seems to common speech, and it
was thought by the writer to be
'defamatory' unquestionably.
"If the subject matter of this writing were political, having in view
the almost unrestrained license in
the use of defamatory epithets in
political writing of almost every
kind, except the very highestgrade,
and the fact that such epithets,
which in the beginning are intend*edto denote ignominy and turpitude, become in the process of
political conflict, by a process of
development, badges of honor and
distinction, and are cheerfully ac-
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cepted as such, I should say that
this phrase did not come within the
Act of Congress and was blameless,
like 'Abolitionist,' 'Black Republican,' ' Copperhead,' ' Carpet-Bagger,' 'Scalawag,'
'Rebel Democracy,' 'Confederate
Brigadier,'
'Bourbon,' 'Free Trader,' 'Tariff
Robber,' 'M ugwump,' and the like.
But the subject-matter of this writing is the return of the patent model
of a car of some kind about which
the writer was angry and ugly in
his temper, and about which he
writes ' indecently,' ' scurrilousy,'
with evident purpose to defame and
injuriously reflect upon the conduct of his correspondent. The
commonplace and excessively vulgar style of the writing does not
relieve it from its criminal character
under this statute. One can be
commonplace, and even vulgar,
without being indecent and defamatory in the legal sense of the
statute, as one may be either of
these, or otherwise may violate the
statute, without being commonplace orvulgar. That which shocks
the ordinary and common sense
of men as an 'indecency' is the
test, as it is also with the other
descriptive terms of the Act."
The principal case deals with an
attempt to collect a debt by sending
a communication through the mail
by postal card, calculated and intended to humiliate and injure the
persons addressed in public estimation. The Court there recognizes
the fact, which is shown by the
Congressional debates upon the
subject; that one, if not the main,
intention of the Act was to utterly
suppress the "practice of enforcing
the payment of debts by mailing
postal cards or letters bearing offensive, threatening orabusive matter, which was open to the inspec-

tion of all persons through whose
hands such postal cards or letters
happened to pass." The Act, says
Judge HAMMOND, was "instigated, as we all know, by the use
of the mails by money collecting
agencies to compel by such threats,
designs and offensive epithets, delinquent debtors to pay their delayed debts:"
U. S. v. Hiegget (U.
S. C. Ct., N. D. Ohio, 1889), 40 Fed.
Repr. 636, 643. But the principal
case holds with much reason that
the intention was only to exclude
from the mails matter which was
of an offensive nature. A mere
dun, couched in proper language,
may still be made upon a postal
card, without rendering it nonmailable. If the dun, however, is
coupled with a threat of suit, or
even of placing the claim in the
hands of alaw agency or lawyer, it
falls within the statutory prohibition.
Under Section 3893 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the Act
of July 12, 1876, the mails were
open to all communications for the
purpose of enforcing the collection
of debts, however abusive or threatening their language might be, provided itwas not of an impure or immodest character. Thus, where a
collector mailed his notices in an
envelope, upon which was printed:
"The Collector of BAD DEBTS, I am
looking for an OLD BILL. The
DEAD-BEAT COLLEcTOR hires me to
look them up,"-and followed this
up with a postal card, upon which
was printed: "Sir: Considering
hownear you can cometo fillabill, I
have decided to post you on all the
DEAD-BEAT lists I know of in the
city, and have accordingly given the
different agencies a chance at you,' "
-the Court (NELSON, J.) held that
no offense had been committed:

GRANT V. DIEBOLD SAFE AND LOCK CO.

Exparle Doranz (U. S. D. Ct., D.
Minn., 1887), 32 Fed. Repr. 76.
But it has been recently held by
BUTIER, J., in the case of U. S. v.
Barnum (U. S. D. Ct., R. D. Pa.,
May 24, i89O), that the sending of
the notice of aLclaim in an envelope
upon the outside of which was
printed "DEAD-BEAT AGENCY,"
was a violation of the Act of September 26, 1888.
It was stated when the last mentioned Act was reported to the

Senate, that an attempt had been
made by certain collection agencies
to evade the prohibition 6f the Act
of June 18, 1888, by using a transparent envelope, through which
their objectionable language, printed in bold characters, could easily
be read. To defeat this scheme, the
words "or otherwise impressed or
apparent," were inserted in the
amendatory Act.
JAMTES C. SE1LERS.

S20reme Court of Wisconsin.
GRANT v. DIEBOLD SAE AND LOCK CO.
The consideration of a contract between two parties for the benefit of a
third party is the consideration for the promise to the third party.
In contracts made between two parties for the benefit of a third person
there is the same privity as that between the promisor and the promisee
in any case, and such third party may bring action thereon in his own
name.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ashland County.
Larnoreux & Gleason for appellant.
Dockery 6 Kingston for respondent.
ORTON, J., May 20, 189o. The plaintiff is the assignee of
his partner's interest in the contract and therefore I will
speak of him as the contracting party. The plaintiff entered
into a written contract with Ashland County to build a
county jail, so far as the wood work and masonry were concerned, September 7, 1887, in which it was agreed that the
county of Ashland should not be liable in any manner for, or
on account of, any damage or delay caused by any other contractor on said building, but the plaintiff should look solely
;and exclusively to said other contractor for remuneration for
any such damage caused by such other contractor's delay or
.otherwise. The defendant, a foreign corporation, on the
same day entered into a written contract with said county
-to do the iron-work on said building, and in such time as not
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in any way to delay the builder of said jail. After so setting
out the contracts, the plaintiff avers in his complaint that he
was the builder of said jail referred to in said last-mentioned
contract, and that the defendant knew of these provisions of
te contract with the plaintiff, and knew that he could not
look to the county for any delay caused by any other contractor, and that he must look to such other contractor therefor, and that said provision in the defendant's contract was
made for the benefit of the plaintiff.
There is an averment in the complaint that the defendant,
knowing the provisions of the contracts aforesaid, and in view
thereof, promised and agreed with the plaintiff that it would
be responsible for any and all damages which might be
caused the plaintiff by reason of its delay in constructing the
iron-work of said jail according to the provisions of its contract with said county, or otherwise. This last averment
-would seem to be a general conclusion from the foregoing,
and not a part of the -writtencontract, or an independent agreement of 'the defendant, and so the learned counsel of the re:spondent treat it in their brief. But the learned counsel of
the appellant insist in their brief that such special promise
.and agreement were actually made by the defendant. At all
events, we shall treat the cause of action as depending upon
the stipulations of the written contracts. The breach is that
The defendant did not construct the iron-work for said jail in
the time agreed upon, and thereby greatly delayed and
-hindered the plaintiff in his part of the work upon said jail,
so that the plaintiff was obliged to carry on his part of the
-work upon said jail at unreasonable times and in small parts,
.-and at great additional costs and expenses, to the plaintifPs
,damage in the sum of $I,213.IO. judgment is demanded for
:such amount. This is substantially the complaint. The
,court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, on the ground
that it stated no cause of action, and this appeal is from such
,order.
1From the fact the defendant knew of this peculiar provision
of the plaintiff's contract, that he should look to the defend,VOL. XXXVIII,-38.
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ant for any damages for delay caused by the defendant, and
not to the county, when it entered into its contract with the
county not to delay the plaintiff in his part of the wdrk, the
two contracts in these respects should be construed together
as having direct relation to each other, if not as one contract.
In this way the intention of the parties by these provisions is
apparent. The county evidently wished to avoid all liability
and litigation on account of delays of the plaintiff by the defendant, and make the defendant directly liable to the plaintiff therefor. If the defendant caused delays of the plaintiff's
work by failure to do its work in proper time, the county
would be liable to the plaintiff therefor, and the county could
hold the defendant responsible therefor. It is therefore provided that the defendant should be directly liable to the
plaintiff instead of the county, and the county should be exempt from liability. In this view, if the plaintiff's damages
had been liquidated when these stipulations were made, the
case would be like Kimball v. Voyes (1864), 17 Wis. 695,
where A. entered into a written contract with B. to pay B.'s
debt to C., and it was held that C. could maintain an action
against A. in his own name. It is also like Cook v. Barrett
(1862), 15 Wis. 596, where A. owes B., and C. owes A. the
same amount, and it was agreed by and between all the
parties that B. should release his debt against A., and look to
C. alone for payment. It was held a valid contract, and that
B. could recover against C. In this case, calling it a legal
liability instead of a debt, the plaintiff released the county,
and agreed to look to the defendant alone, and the defendant
agreed to become responsible to the plaintiff. Why is it not
a valid agreement between them all?
But there is another principle equally well established, and
that is that a person may recover on an agreement made with
another for his special benefit. To illustrate by cases in this
court: If one sells chattels to another, and agrees to pay all
liens upon them, the persons holding'such liens may enforce
them against the vendor, because the promise was made for
their benefit, although not parties to the agreement: Kollock v. Parcher (1881), 52 Wis. 393. Where one sells his
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land and personal property to another, and the vendee agrees
to pay part of the consideration by paying all the debts of the
vendor, any holder of any such debt may sue the vendee
therefor, and thus avail himself of his promise to the vendor
made for his benefit: Bassett v. Hughes (1877), 43 Wis.
319. Once for all, the principle laid down in this case, and
applicable to all like cases, is: "It is settled in this State that
when one person, for a valuable consideration, engages with
another [by simple contract or by covenant] to do some act
for the benefit of a third person, the latter may maintain an
action against the former for breach of such engagement:"
Cotlerillv. Stevens (i86o) 1O Wis. 422 ; Pulney v. FarnhIamt
(1870), 27 Wis. 187; ldcDozell v. Laev (1874), 35 Wis. I;
and the cases szipra, and other cases cited by appellant.
Is this principle applicable to this case? The learned
counsel of the respondent contends that it is not, because
there is (i) no consideration for the engagement of the defendant not to injure the plaintiff by delays in its iron-work
on the jail; and (2) no privity between the parties. In the
cases cited above, the consideration in one was the purchase
money of the chattels, and in the other the personal property
and the land sold ; in the first for the vendor to pay the liens,
and in the other for the vendee and grantee to pay the debts
of the vendor and grantor. In all such cases the consideration of the promise is the same as that for any other stipulation of the contract. The consideration of the contract between the two parties for the benefit of a third party is the
consideration for the promise to the third party. The defendant, in consideration of the money it was to receive, agreed
to do the iron-work of the jail; and agreed farther, for the
same consideration, to do it in a particular manner and time,
so as not to delay and damage the plaintiff. It was a similar
consideration between the plaintiff and the county for the
plaintiff's release of the county for the delays of the defendant, and for his promise to look to the defendant alone for
his damages on account of such delays. Knowing this, the
defendant made its agreement for the plaintifPs benefit, in-
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stead of the benefit of the county, in consideration of what it
was to receive from the county on its contract. As to the
privity of the parties, there is the same privity as that between the promisor and the promisee in any case, and the
.same privity as in all the above cases. It is by no means
certain that the defendant would not be liable to the plaintiff,
the other contractor on the job, if it should injure him by
unnecessary delays in doing the iron-work, without any direct
promise not to do so. In such a case there would be a conjunction of wrong and damage or injury which is the basis
of liability, and constitutes a good cause of action. But this
is aside from this case. We are clearly satisfied that the comp-laint states a good cause of action, and is not liable to the
demurrer.
The order of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause
Temanded for further proceedings according to law.
No principle of law is better es-tablished than that which declares
that all contracts not under seal
must have a consideration to support them, and that the parties
must be in privity with each other.
Notwithstanding this, there is perhaps no question which has oftener
-occupied the attention of the courts
than that of consideration and
privity of contract, and especially
is this so in cases similar to the
principal one, wherein the rights of
-third parties to sue thereon are
brought into question.
In the case of an ordinary contract between two persons, for the
sale and purchase of an article,
very little difficulty arises upon
these questions, for, as regards the
consideration, it matters not how
slight the benefit may be, so long
as it is of some value in the eye of
the law, provided the transaction be
otherwise free from fraud and imposition : Sprangler v. Springer

(1854), 22 Pa. 454; Piercev. Fuller
(1x81), 8 Mass. 223.
When, however, the question
arises as to the right of a third person, not a party to the original contract, to sue thereon, difficulties
arise and it is by no means an easy
matter to distinguish between and
define, -what cases come within the
rule, and what within its exceptions.
The rule was not definitely settled
in England till the year 1861 when
the case of Tweddle v. Atkinson, x
B. & S. 393, came before the Court,
and Justice WIGHTMA, stated the
law to be "now well established
that no stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract although made for his benefit."
In this opinion, Justices CROMPTON
and BLACKBURN concurred, the
formersaying :-"The modem cases
have * * overruled the older decisions ; they show that the consideration must move from the party
entitled to sue upon the contract.
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It would be amonstrous proposition
to say that a person was a party to
the contract for the purpose of suing
upon it for his own advantage and
not a party to it for the purpose of
being sued."
There would, however, seem to
be an exception to the rule, even in
England, in the case of money had
and received. Yet the mere fact of
A having sentmoney to B,tobe paid
by him to C, does not of itself impose such liability upon B to pay it
to C as will entitle the latter to sue
therefor in his own name; but if
there is any assent on B's part,
either express or implied, that he
will pay or hold the money to C's
use, then the action lies: Lilly v.
Hays (1836), 5 A. & E. 548.
Upon this point, however, the
authorities in this country differ.
Mr. Justice STORY in his work on
contracts ( 552), after stating that
the English rule is againstthe right
of a thirdparty, says: "In America, the decisions have been conflicting on the point; but the tendency of the courts is in the same
direction."
He cites Exchange
Bank v. Rice, ififra, and GriW11h v.
Ingledew (1821), 6 S. & R. (Pa.)
429, in support of his statement.
Mr. Parsons is however of the opposite opinion, for he says: "In
this country, the right of a third
party to bring an action on a
promise made to another for his
benefit, seems to be somewhat more
positively asserted; and we think
it would be safe to consider this a
prevailing rule with us; indeed it
has been held that such promise is
to be deemed made to the third
party if adopted by him, though he
wasnot cognizant ofitwhen made."
He cites Lawrence v. Fox, infra,
and Steman v. Harrison (1862), 42
Pa. 49, in support of his conten-

tion: Par. Contracts, 468. This.
latter case was decided upon a wellknown principle of law, that a.
promise to accept a bill for a fixedamount is equivalent to an acceptance, not only as to the drawer, but
as to every party who takes the bill
on the faith of such promise. The
prevailing inducement for consider
ing a promise to accept, as an acceptance, is that credit is thereby
given to the bill.
Notwithstanding this diversity of
opinion among the text-book writers, they all state the general rule
upon the right of a person to sue
upon a contract to be that the obligation is, under ordinary circumstances, confined to the parties, and.
cannot be enforced by third persons: Hare, Contracts 193. There
must be privity of contractbetween
the plaintiff and the defendant, for,
says Justice
ni-cALIv in Zfellen
Adm'r v. Whipple (1854), i Gray
(Mass.) 317 : "A plaintiff in an
action on a simple contract, must
be the person from whom the consideration of the contract moved,
and * * a stranger to th6 consideration cannot sue on the contract."
Many cases are to be found upon
the subject, but they are not all
reconcilable with one another. They
all support the rule as laid down in
Mifellenv. Whipple, supra, but admit of many exceptions thereto.
The inconsistency would seem to
lie in the action of assumpsit,
which had its origin in tort, upon
the ground that one who is injured
by another has his action to recover
damages, although a stranger, and
becomes entitled by acting on the
inducement held forth:
Hare,
Contracts 193.
In the case of an ordinary contract by A with B, for a consideration, to pay B's debt to C, there is
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an absolute contract entered into
between A and B, but to it C fs not
an original party, and the question
arises, how can C, who is not privy
to such contract, sue A upon his
promise, made upon a valuable consideration, for the debt owing to
him by B ? Clearly so far as A and
B are concerned, B is relieved from
the payment of such debt, and
could bring suit against A, if,
through his breach, B should be
compelled to pay. But wheie does
C's right come in? Does it spring
directly from the contract itself?
Some cases have gone so far as to
hold that such is the case, that the
right does spring from the contract,
and for this reason, that B in making the contract made it for C if he
chose to accede to it, and that all
that C has to do is to ratify or assent to it,which he may do by bringing action thereon. Now if such
be the case, how does C stand with
regard to B ? It is a well established principle of law that a party
must ratify or assent to the contract as made. He cannot assent
to it and yet dissent from its terms.
It therefore follows that if A by the
contract released, or ratherrelieved,
B from all liability to C, the latter
in assenting to such contract releases B from all liability and
agrees to look to A wholly.
This theory is contended for in
Warrez v. Balchelder (1845), 16 N.
H. 580, where the defendant was
indebted to one Dow upon a promissory note, and Dow was indebted
to the plaintiff, who had brought
an action and summoned the defendant as trustee. Dow requested
defendant to pay the debt and costs
to the plaintiff out of the money
due upon the note, which defendant promised to do and paid the
balance to Dow, who surrendered

the note. Plaintiff afterwards requested defendant to pay him the
money, which he refused to do. In
an elaborate opinion, wherein he
examines the cases upon the question, Justice WOODS says, "The
facts before us present a case of
money had and received by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff.
And provided the plaintiff is so far
a party to the arrangement as to be
entitled to receive the money, he
may, upon the general principle of
the cases cited, maintain this action.
But if before commencing suit, he
was no party to the arrangement,
either by an original participation
in it or by a subsequent assent to
it and adoption of its provisions,
he does not stand in such privity
with the defendant as to be entitled
to maintain the action: But the
money having been deposited with
the defendant for the purpose of
paying the debt which Dow owed
to the plaintiff, the assent of the
plaintiff to that arrangement, and
his acceptance of that provision
made for the payment of his demand, whether such assent and acceptance were contemporaneous
with the acts of the other parties *
* * or subsequent * * must operate to discharge the debt for which
it was designed to provide, unless
there should be cause for holding
that the provision was merely collateral. * * The deposit by a debtor with a third party for the payment of his debt, and the promise
of him with whom the money is
deposited, to pay the same to the
creditor, together with the assent of
the creditor to the arrangement,
and his acceptance of the provision
which is made by it for securingthe
payment, his claim must be deemed
and taken to be discharged and
paid, and a new debt and a new
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debtor adopted in the place of the
old." The case of Clouegl v. Giles
(1886) 64 N. H. 73, is to the same
effect.
Another view of the question
has, however, been taken, which
looks upon the contract between A
and B as imposing a duty upon A
to pay B's debt to C, from which the
law will imply a promise in favor
of C. Here the duty and the promise must be equal to, or correspond
with each other. Vhat is the duty
imposed on A, and where is the implied promise? The duty is to pay
B's debt to C instead of B and so
relieve B from all liability, and the
implied promise arises between A
and C, for if C sues A upon the
promise made by A to B, (which is
impliedly made with C) he must
sue him as liable instead of B and
release B.
The case of Bohanan v. Pope
(1856), 42 Me. 93, follows this principle. It was a case in -which one
Whitney had a contract with the
defendant as to the hauling of logs.
Plaintiff was employed by Whitney
to haul and cut, the logs, and not
being paid brought an action
.against the defendant to recover the
amount due him. Justice MAY, in
delivering the judgment of the
Court, proceeded as follows:-" It
is undoubtedly true, as a general
proposition, that no action can be
maintained upon a contract, except
by some person who is a party to it.
But this rule of law, like most others, has its exceptions ; as, for instance, where money has been paid
by one party, to a second, for the
benefit of a third, in which case the
latter may maintain an action
against the first for the money. So,'
too, where a party for a valuable
consideration stipulates with another, by simple contract, to pay

money or do some other act for the
benefit of a third person, the latter,
for whose benefit the promise is
made, if there be no otherobjection
to his recovery than a want of privity
between the parties, may maintain
an action for a breach of such engagement."
He relied upon the
language ofJustice BIGZI.O\W, in the
opinion of the Court in Brewer v.
Dyer (I85i), 7 Cush. (Mass.) 337,
which reads thus :-" It [the rule]
does not rest upon the ground of
any actual or supposed relationship
between the parties, as some of the
earlier cases would seem to indicate ;
nor upon the reason that the defendant, by entering into such an
agreement, has impliedly made
himself the agent of the plaintiff,
but upon the broader and more satisfactory basis, that the law, operating on the act of the parties,
creates the duty, establishes the
privity, and implies the promise
and obligation, on which the action
is founded."
In support of the contention that
if the third party sues the promisor he thereby releases the person
primarily liable; Justice MAY in
his opinion in Bohanan v. Pope,
suipra, says: "While the law does
this in favor of a third person,
beneficially interested in the contract, it does not confine such person to the remedy which it so provides ; he may * * if he choose,
disregard it and seek his remedy
directly against the party with
whom his contract primarily exists.
But if he does so, then such party
may recover against the party contracting with him, in the same
manner as if the stipulation in the
contract had been made directly
with him and not for the benefit of
a third person., The two remedies
are not concurrent but elective, and
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an election of the latter implies an
abandoment of the former." To the
same effect, Todd v. Tobey (1848),
29 Me., 2i9; Afolley v. Aifanuf. Ins.
Co. (1849), Id. 337. The cases of
Johnson v. Collins (1862), 14 Iowa
63 ; Thompson- v. Bertram (1863),
Id. 476; Scotl'sAd'rv. Gillel al.
(1865), 19 Id. 187; Jo1hnson v.
Zitappb (1873) 36 Id. 616; Phillifps
Adm'r v. Van Schaick & Wilcox
(1873), 37 Id. 229 ; Roberts v.
Austin Corbin & Co. (1868), 26 Id.,
315, support this view. The Iowa
Code of Civil procedure provides:
"SECuTON

2543.

Every

action

must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest, except as
provided in the next section,"
which relates to actions by trustees,
etc.
The case of National Banke v.
GrandLodge (1878), 98 U. S. 123,
was an action brought to compel
payment of certain coupons formerly attached to bonds issued by the
Masonic Hall Association, a corporation existing under the laws of
the State of Missouri, in relation to
which bonds the Grand Lodge
adopted a resolution as follows:
"Resolved, that this Grand Lodge
assume the payment of the two
hundred thousand dollars bonds,
issued by the Masonic Hall Association, provided that stock is issued
to the Grand Lodge by said association to the amount of said assumption of payment by this Grand
Lodge, as the said bonds are paid."
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice STRONG, as fol-

lows:
"The resolution of the
Grand Lodge was but a proposition
made to the Masonic Hall Association, and, when accepted, the resolution and acceptance constituted at most only an executory contract inter Partes. * * The holders

of the bonds were not parties to it,
and there was no privity between
them and the Lodge. They may
have had an indirect interest in the
performance of the undertakings
of the parties, as they would have
in an agreement by which the lodge
should undertake to lend money to
the association, or contract to buy
its stock to enable it to pay its
debts; but that is a very different
thing from the privity necessary to
enable them to enforce the contract
by suits in their own names. We
do not propose to enter at large
upon a consideration of the inquiry
how far privity of contract between
a plaintiff and defendant is necessary to the maintenance of an action of assumpsit. * * No doubt the
general rule is that such a privity
must exist. But there are confessedly many exceptions to it. One
of them, and by far the most frequent one, is the case where under
a contract between two persons,
assets have come to the promisor's
hands, or under his control, which
in equity belong to a third person.
In such a case, it is held that the
third person may sue in his own
name. But then the suit is founded rather on the implied undertaking the law raises from the possession of the assets, than on the
express promise. Another .exception is where the plaintiff is the
beneficiary solely interested in the
promise, as where one person contracts with another, to pay money
or deliver some valuable thing to
a third. But where a debt already
exists from one person to another,
a promise by a third person to pay
such debt, being primarily for the
benefit of the original debtor, and
to relieve him from liability to pay
it (there being no novation), he has
a right of action against the prom-
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isor for his own indemnity ; and
if the original creditor can also sue,
the promisor would be liable to two
separate actions, and therefore the
rule is that the original creditor cannot sue."
Cragin v. Lovell (1883), 1o9 U.
S. 194, followed the doctrine laid
down in National Bank v. Grand
Lodge, suira. In this case an action was brought against Cragin,
alleging a sale of a plantation by the
plaintiff to one Fisk, a portion of
the price being paid in cash, and
nine notes for the balance payable
in successive years, secured by a
mortgage of the estate. Plaintiff
further alleged that Cragin had
paid the first three notes, and that
foreclosure proceedings had been
taken for a balance due plaintiff on
the notes. That subsequently to
the purchase by Fisk, Cragin claimed that Fisk was acting merely as
agent; that the purchase in his own
name was illegal; that the money
paid down at the time of sale, and
subsequently was Cragin's; and
that he had been adjudged, by final
decree, to be the legal owner of the
estate.
The plaintiff, in support of his
right of action against Cragin, relied upon the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870: "ART. i89o. A person
may also, in his own name, make
some advantage for a third person
the condition or consideration of a
commutative contiact, or onerous
donation; and if such third person
consents to avail himself of the advantage stipulated in his favor, the
contract can not be revoked."
And also upon the Code of Practice
of that State: "ART. 35. An equitable action is that which does
not immediately arise from a contract, but from equity in favor of a
third person, not a party to it, and

for whose benefit certain stipulations have been made; thus, if one
stipulated in a contract entered into with another person, and as an
express condition of that contract,
that this person should pay a certain sum on his account, or give a
certain thing to a third person, not
a party to the act, that third person
has an equitable action against the
one who has contracted the obligation, to enforce the execution of the
stipulation." Justice GRAY however held that the provisions of the
Codes did not apply to the case,
saying: "The only allegations
touching the relation of Cragin to
these notes are, that in a suit by
him against Fisk, he alleged that
Fisk, in purchasing the land, acted
merely as his agent, and that he
owned the land and was liable and
ready to pay for it. * * If this
amounted to a promise to any one,
it was not a promise to the plaintiff, nor even a promise to Fisk to
pay to the plaintiff the amount of
the notes, but it was, at the utmost,
a promise to Fisk to pay that
amount to him, or to indemnify
him in case he should have to pay
it."
In Pope v. Porter, (1887, U. S.
Cir. Ct., S. D. Iowa, C. D.), 3 3 Fed.
Repr. 7,the plaintiffwas a mortgagee
of personal property, sold by the
mortgagor to the defendant, who
agreed to pay the mortgage debt as
part of the purchase nfoney. Here
SHIRAS, J., states:
"It has long
been the settled law in Iowa that
an action at law can be maintained
upon a promise made by A to B to
pay a debt due from B to C, provided a sufficient consideration is
shown to exist."
The cases of
Bank v. GrandLodge (1878), 98 U.
S. 123, and Cragin v. Lovell (i883),
109 U. S. 194, subra, were relied
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upon by counsel for the defendant
as supporting the doctrine that,
under the facts in the present case,
-here was no privity of action between the parties.
The learned
Judge, however, dismissed this con-tention by showing, that ii Cragin
-v. Lovell, the facts failed to show an
agreement between Cragin and
Fisk that the former should pay to
1the mortgagee the debt due her.
He also drew attention to the fact
,that in the cases cited, "the promise made by defendant was concur-rent with and dependent upon the
--contract of the other party, and,
'being an executory contract between the intermediate parties
thereto, a third party could not sue
thereon, without, in effect, chang.ing the meaning of the contract."
-He cites the opinion of Justice
.STRONG, in
National Bank v.
'Grand Lodge, sufira, as stating the
doctrine applicable to the present
case and shows that in the case then
before the Court the property "belonged in equity to the plaintiffs;
that is to say, they were entitled,
'by virtue of their mortgage, to take
possession thereof, to sell the same,
and apply the proceeds to the payanent of the debt due them. The
,defendant came into possession of
tthese assets solely through the contract he made with Cheney [the
mortgagor], whereby he assumed
and promised to pay the debt due
Vplaintiff as part of the purchase
-price of the corn, and as, by means
-of this possession thus obtained, he
has been enabled to sell the corn,
and.now holds the proceeds, he is
,liable-to suit on part of plaintiffs."
*Thisview is taken in the case of
,Wood v. Moriarly (1887), 15 R.
Z[. 5s8, .which was an action of as,umfisit brought by plaintiff against
the defendant to recover the price

of lumber furnished to one Tibbetts
for use in the building of defendant's
houses. There was a written instrument executed by Tibbetts,
transferring and assigning the contract to defendant in consideration
of a release from further obligation
under it. At the trial, parol evidence was admitted to prove the
purchase of the lumber, the execution of the release, and that defendant, besides paying the considerations mentioned, further agreed to
pay all bills incurred by Tibbetts on
account of the contract. It was
contended on the part of the defendant, that the agreement was
within the Statute of Frauds, being
an agreement, not in writing, to
answer for the debt of another.
This argument was however met
by ChiefJustice DURFEE in these
words, "An agreement to answer
for the debt of another, to come
within the Statute of Frauds, must
be an agreement with the creditor.
A promise by A to B to pay a debt
due from B to C is not within the
Statute of Frauds * * The contract
is absolute * * The course of decision in this State favors the creditor's right to sue, and in principle,
we think, recognizes it, though it
has not hitherto extended to a purely
oral contract." He cites and relies
upon Urquhart v. Brayton (1878),
12 R. I. 169; and Merriman v.

Social Oanufacturing Co. (1878),
Id. 175, in support of his theory,
and remarks,-" Courts that allow
the action generally hold that it 'is
not affected by the Statute of
Frauds, though, * * they do not
unite in the reasons which they
give for so holding."
A somewhat differentview of this
phase of the question has 'been
taken in some of the Courts in this
country, holding the contract with-
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in the provisions of the Statute of
Frauds and therefore void unless in
writing. Thus in Connecticut, the
Court has decided that a promise
made by A to B to pay B's debt to
C,is within the Statute of Frauds
and void unless in writing. This
view was taken in Clafb1 v. Lawton
(1862), 31 Conn. 95, an action of
assumpsit, alleging a promise of the
defendants to pay a debt due to the
plaintiffs from the firm of F. & W.,
with a general count for money had
and received. F. & W. were publishers of a newspaper, and sold out
to defendants, Lawton & Wright,
and transferred to them theirassets,
including the debts due to the firm.
As part of the consideration, it was
claimed that defendants agreed to
pay the debts ofF. &W., the plaintiff being the principal creditor.
The Court, however, held the agreement to be void, so far at least as the
plaintiffs were concerned, by the
Statute of Frauds, "Justice DuTTon
remarking, "It would seem that
the mere statement of the case
would be enough to show that it is
within both the letter and spirit of
the Statute. The Statute in terms
requires written evidence of any
agreement whereby to charge, the
defendant upon any special promise
to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another." Further
he contended that "the promise offered in evidence was not to the
plaintiffs, nor intended for their
benefit. Itwasa merearrangement
for their own purposes, between defendants and F. & W. The consideration did not move from the plaintiffs." These remarks are approved of by Justice BUTrER in Packer
v. Benton (i868), 35 Conn. 343.
The earlier cases in Tennessee are
to the same effect; Camlibell v.
Findley (1842), 3 Humph. (Tenn.),

330 ; McAlister v. Marberry(1844),
4 Id. 426, but the case of Moore v.
Stovall (1879), 2 Lea (Tenn), 543,
overrules them and establishes that
such a contract is not within the
Statute, and that the party for whose
benefit it is made may sue thereon.
There, one Johnson bought land of
the plaintiff and gave as part payment his note, a lien being retained
on the face of the deed for the purchase money, Johnson sold to defendant, the consideration being the
assumption by defendant of the debt
to plaintiffs. Upon a rehearing,
Justice FRUEMAN delivered the
opinion of the Court: "The question turns, so far as the principle
involved is concerned, on whether
this contract is within the Statute
of Frauds, apd therefore required
not only to be in writing, but signed by the party to be charged, and
also made direct to the party suing
on it. * * Holding the decisions
referred to [Camfbbell v. .Findley,
supfra and Erwin v. Wagner (i813),
Cook (Tenn.) 400) not to be in accord with sound principle, the only
question is, whether they should be
overruled orremain simply because
they been made. We think they
should be overruled and the rule of
law established on a sound basis.
Several considerations lead us to
this conclusion. The question is
not one on which rights of property
depend, nor will titles be in the least
affected by it. It -will in our judgment give us a rule on the subject,
not only in accord with sound
principle, but be in accord with
other principles of our law, well
settled, on which we habitually act.
For instance, it is beyond question
that in a court of equity the law has
been long settled that'where a vender has sold the estate without
notice, if the purchase money has
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not been paid, the original vendor
may proceed against the estate for
his lien, or against the purchase
money in the hands of the purchaser for satisfaction:' 2 Story
Eq. J., I232. That is the precise
case, with the additional fact that
here the purchaser has expressly
contracted the money shall be paid
by him to the original vendor, which
makes a much stronger case. The
principle in such cases is, that the
party has money in his hands which
he cannot conscientiously withhold
from the other party. This is the
law in a court of equity, but why
not in a court of law when the action of assumpsit, an equitable action in such cases, entitles the party
to recover that which he equitably
ought to have. * * *, * Lastly, it
attains the justice of the case, and
can do no harm to any one to enforce the solemn contract ofa party,
based on a valuable consideration,
received and enjoyed by him."
The same doctrine is upheld in
California, where the Civil Code
gives the third party a right of action upon a contract made expressly for his benefit. See Section I559
of the Civil Code cited with McLarez v. Hutchinson, itfra.
The rule in favor of such actions;
however, does not apply to the case
of a party incidentally benefited by
the contract. Thus, in Chung Kee
v. Davidsonz et al. (1887), 73 Cal.
522, where the defendant Cook executed a deed which, upon its face,
purported to be an absolute conveyance of certain property, but
was in fact a mortgage to secure
certain indebtedness from Cook to
the defendants. By a defeasance
subsequently executed, it was agreed
that Cook should retain possession
of, and manage the property, which
consisted of mines and turn over to

the defendants the entire result of
each "clean out" of the "flumes
and under-currents of the mines,"
be applied "to the defraying of the
expenses of running and working
said mines," and "the payment of
all promissory notes, obligations,
and accounts of indebtedness of
whatsoever nature," due said defetidants. Whje working the mine
Cook became indebted to certain
Chinamen for labor done and laborers furnished, and gave to the
Chinamen a written statement of
their indebtedness. These claims
were properly transferred to the
plaintiff, who brought action for
the amount due, alleging that under
the terms of the agreement or written contract they were entitled to
receive the amount from the defendants and Cook, out of certain
"gold-dust," the result of a clearup. Defendants had paid several
amounts, upon Cook's order, had
taken a sum on account of money
due by Cook, and had also paid another party's account, for work
done for Cook. The Court held
that the contract was not made expressly for the benefit of the plaintiff's assignors. On the contrary,
that it was made expressly for the
benefit of the parties named therein ; and that the most that could be
said was that it was a contract incidentally for the benefit of those
who worked in the mine. "It is
not necessary, that the parties for
whose benefit the contract has been
made should be named in the contract. It must appear, however,
by the direct terms of the contract,
that it was made for the benefit
of such parties.' It cannot be implied from the fact that the contract would, if carried out between
the parties to it, operate incidentally
to their benefit."
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The action was brought under
the Civil Code of the State which
provides: SEC. 1559. "A contract
made expressly for the benefit of a
third person, may be enforced by
-him at anytime before the parties
thereto rescind it."
The distinctions taken by the
-various courts are not all readily
reconcilable, yet those stated by
justice SERGEANT in Blymire v.
Boistle (1837), 6 Watts (Pa.) 182,
would seem to be the law in Pennsylvania,and to have been generally
followed: "If one pay money to
another for the use of a third person, or having money belonging to
another, agree with that other to
pay it to a third, action lies by the
person beneficially interested. But
where the contract is for the benefit of the contracting party, and the
third person is a stranger to the
contract and consideration, the
action must be by the promisee."
Quoting the language of Justice
H TToN in Hadfield v. Levis
(1656), Het. 176, he proceeds:
"'there is a difference where the
promise is to perform to one who
is not interested in the cause, and
when he hath an interest. In the
first case, he to whom the promise
is made, shall have the action, and
not he to whom the promise is to
be performed."
As pointed out by Justice WOODWARD, in Gutriev. Kerr (1878),
85 Pa. 303: "In the one instance
the promisor becomes the custodian and trustee of a fund actually
belonging to the beneficiary. In
the other, he undertakes to pay
some money or do some act in consideration of a benefit conferred on
himself." In Torrens v. Camptbell
(1874) 74 Pa. 470, Justice MERCUR
stated the first branch of the rule
to be that where the promisor re-

ceives money or personal property
to be converted into money, in trust
for a third party, the action may
be sustained in the name of the
latter."
The true reason given for this
distinction may be gathered from
the opinion of Justice SERGEANT
in Blymire v. Boistle supra, wherein he says, "Where one person contracts with another to pay money
to a third, or to deliver over some
valuable thing and such third person is thus the only party in interest, he ought to possess the right to
release the demand or recover it by
action. But when a debt already
exists from one person to another,
promise by a third person to pay
such debt, being for the benefit of
the original debtor, and to relieve
him from the payment of it, he
ought to have a right of action
against the promisor for his own indemnity, and if the promisor were
also liable to the original creditor,
he would be subject to two separate
actions at the same time, for the
same debt, which would be inconvenient, and might lead to injustice." The case of Morrison v.
Beckey (1837), 6 Watts (Pa.) 349,
supports these views.
In such cases the consideration,
to use the words of Justice ROGERS
in Hindv. Holdship (1833), 2 Vatts
(Pa.) io4, "is sufficient, if it arise
from any act of the plaintiff, from
which the defendant or a stranger
derives any benefit, however small,
if such act is performed by the
plaintiff, with the assent, express
or implied, of the defendant; or
by reason of any damage, or any
suspension or forbearance of the
plaintiff's right at law or in equity;
or any possibility of loss occasioned
to the plaintiff by the promise of

GRANT V. DIEBOLD SAFE AND LOCK CO.

another, although no actual benefit
accrues to the party undertaking."
Hostetter v. Hollinger (1888),
117 Pa. 6o6, was a case in which
John S., and Jacob Hostetter each
placed a certain sum in the hand of
their brother Henry, upon his
agreement to contribute a like sum
to the fund, the whole to be for the
use of Maria Baer since deceased.
Maria Baer was not a party to the
consideration, and was in some
sense a stranger to the contract.
"Although she may not even have
known of the transaction between
the three brothers, yet, if the contract was wholly for her own benefit; if the control of the fund was
wholly relinquished by the parties
creating it; and Henry Hostetter
acted, or assumed to act, as her
agent in receiving and holding it,
so that the ownership of the fund
vested in her, she might maintain
an action in her own name when
she became informed of the facts,
It is well settled in a series of decisions, that he for whose benefit a
promise is made, may maintain an
action upon it, although no consideration pass from him to the defendant, nor any promise from the
defendant, directly to the plaintiff:"
CLARK, J.,citing Hindv. Holdshkfi
(1833), 2 Watts. (Pa.) 104 ; justice
v. Tallman (1878),86 Pa. 147 where
the defendant had promised Wilson
for a valuable consideration to pay
his debt to the plaintiff, out of property placed in his hands by Wilson,
and Townsend v. Long (1875), 77 Id.
143.
The distinctions, which arise
where the contract is for the benefit
of the contracting party, and the
third party is a stranger to the consideration, are perhaps more fully
illustrated by the case of iountz v.
Holthouse (1878), 85 Pa. 235, where

Campbell and Young, being associated as partners, became indebted
to Holthouse,and Young, by a written agreement, sold his interest to.
Kountz; the latter assuming and
agreeing to pay Young's indebtedness. Campbell and Kountz continued the business. Holthouse
brought action against Kountz and
the Court ruled that it would not
lie, Justice iERcUR, saying:"There is nothing in the case before
us indicating that the property sold
to Kountz was to be delivered over
to the defendant in error; nor that
it was to be c6nverted into money
and the proceeds be paid to him;
nor is there any fair inference, * *
that the avails and proceeds of theproperty and business should pay
and discharge the debt due to the
defendant in error. * * To enable the third person to sustain theaction, money or property must
have been placed in the hands of
the defendant for his use, or he
must have become a party to the
new agreement." To the same effect are the cases of Torrens v.
o
Camfbell (1874), 74 Pa. 47 , and.
Blymire v. Boistle, sufira. The
cases of Torrens v. Campbell and
Kountz v. Hollhouse are followed
in Zell's Appeal (1886), ii Pa. 537.
The same ruling is followed in
Peacock v. Williams (1887), 98 N.
C. 324, -where it appeared that the
plaintiff had furnished lumber to a.
contractor, to be used upon certain
property owned by one Luke; that
his account had not been paid;
that the defendant contracted withLuke for a note of $8oo to pay off
and discharge "all liens and incumbrances whatever" upon the
said property; that plaintiff had a
lien on the property, registered and
filed, and that Luke had due noticeof the plaintiff's claim before set--
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tlement with the contractor. The
defendant had stipulated after payment of all bills to surrender to
Luke "full and free possession"
of the property, "free from all
liens and encumbrances."
In the
opinion of the Court, Chief Justice
SMzIH said, that "the plaintiff's
right of action rested entirely upon
the undertaking on the part of
Williams * * to surrender the
house to the owner of the lot, 'free
from all liens and incumbrances
whatever.'
*
* The defendant
incurred, under this agreement
and from his possession of the note,
no personal liability which the
plaintiff can enforce in this form of
action, ex contractu. The agreement is in substance one for the
indemnity of the owner of the
property against its being subjected
to the asserted lien, and is solely
between the partiesto it, with whon
theplaintiff is not inpirivity. * *
Here there is no promise to pay the
plaintiff, and the defendant has no
funds with which to make the payment, but only a note secured from
the party by which they might be
derived."
In Alabama, a somewhat different course has been taken by the
Courts, for in Shotwell v. Gilkey
(1858), 31 Ala. 724, Justice %VWALIR
stated the law as follows: " Where
one, for a sufficient consideration
moving from another indebted to
a third person, promises him so indebted to pay his creditor, a failure to comply with the contract
gives a right of action, either to the
promisee, or to the person for
whose benefit the promise was
made." See also Mason v. Hall
(1857), 3o Ala. 599. The Civil
Code of this State (Id. i886, p. 577)
provides: "2594. Actions on promissory notes, bonds, or other con-
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tracts, express or implied, for the
payment of money, must be-prosecuted in the name of the party
really interested, whether he has
the legal title or not, subject to any
defense the payor, obligor, or debtor.
may have had against the payee,
obligee, or creditor, previous to notice of assignment or transfer, except that, in actions upon bills of
exchange and promissory notes
payable at a bank or banking:
house, or at a designated place,
and other commercial instruments,
the suit must be instituted in the
name of the person' having thelegal title." The meaning of thewords, "the party really interested," was considered in Yerby
v. Sexton (1872), 48 Ala. 311,
and was thus explained by Chief
Justice PECK: "Where the dry
legal title is in one, and a clear,
equitable title is in another, whether by transfer, delivery, or otherwise, to whom alone the money belongs, and who only is -entitled to
receive it, and authorized to discharge the debtor,-in such cases,
there is no trouble; the action
must be brought in the name of the
equitable owner. He is * * the
party really interested. But where
the party having the legal title, is
also the only party entitled to receive the money and discharge the
debtor, although, when collected,
he holds the money, not for his own
use but for the use of some other
person or persons, and to whose
use he is to apply it or to whom he
is bound to pay it,-in such cases,
the action must be in the name of
the party having the legal title."
The Code of Civil procedure of
Arizona provides: "68o. Every
action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest,
except as otherwise prescribed."

6o8
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The Revised Statutes of Arkansas, ch. i19, Id. 1884, P. 972, provide: "SIc. 4933. Every action
must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest, except as
provided in Sections 4935, 4936,
'
and 4938.
California Courts sustain the
right of the original creditor to
bring his action, except in cases of
merely incidental benefit: page 604,
sufira.
In Coloradosuch actions are supported, justice WELL, in Lehow
v. Simonton (1877), 3 Colo. 346,
after quoting numerous decisions
pro and con, saying: "The doctrine of the last [those in favor of
the action] quoted,while professedly
an anomaly, seems to us the more
convenient. It accords the remedy
to the party who in most instances
is chiefly interested to enforce the
promise, and avoids multiplicity of
actions. That it should occasion
injustice to either party seems tous
impossible." This is also the law
in South Carolina, Thomson v.
Gordon (1848), 3 Strobh. (S. C.)
196.
The Connecticut courts require
the promise to be in writing, in
compliance with the provisions of
the Statute of Frauds: page 603,
suira.
In Dakota the quesion is provided for by the Civil Code, which
provides: " 3499. A contract,made
expressly for the benefit of a third
person may be enforced by him at
any time before the parties thereto
rescind it."
In Florida,the courts uphold the
right of a third party to sue on a
promise made to another for his
benefit. Hunter v. Wilson, Stearly
c& Co. (1885), 21 Fla. 250, but there
must be a clear intention and purpose upon both the part of the

promisor and promisee to benefit
such third person directly and primarily: Wright v. Terry (1887), 23
Fla. 16o.
The Code of Georgia, (Id. 1882)
2747. If there be a
provides: "
valid consideration for the promise,
it matters not from whom it is
moved ; the promisee may sustain
his action) though a stranger to the
consideration."
In Idaho, the Revised Statutes
(Id. 1887, p. 380) provide: "SEc.
3221. A contract made expressly
for the benefit of a third person,
may be enforced by him at any
time before the parties thereto rescind it."
In Illinois, the distinction between simple contracts and specialties, with reference to this right,
is abolished by Section i9,ch. iio
of the Revised Statutes ofthat State
as decided by the case of Dean v.
Walker (1883), 107 Ill 540, wherein justice CRAIG, in delivering the
opinion of the Court said:-"It is
said a third party cannot bring an
action m h' own name on a contract
under seal between third parties
* * * but * * the rule of the common law on that subject has been
changed by Section i9, chapter iro
ofthe Revised Statutes of 1874, page
776, so that now it is immaterial,
for the purpose of bringing the suit,
whether the contract is under seal
or not." The section referred to
reads as follows :-" i9. Any deed,
bond, note, covenant or other instrumentunder seal (except penal
bonds) may be sued and declared upon or set off as heretofore, or in any
form of action in which such instrument might have been sued and
declared upon or set off if it had not
been under seal, and demands upon
simple contracts may be set-off
against demands upon sealed instrn-
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Stat. ed. 1889, p. 1013).
In Hume v. Broweret al.(1887),
25 111 App. 130; PLTASANTS, P. J.,
said:-" It has long been settled
that a third party may sue on a
simple contract entered into by
others forhis benefit, and upon such
an agreement to pay all the debts of
-oneparty any creditor of such party
may maintain an action."
He
-cited Shober v. Kerting (1883), 107
111 344; and Snell v. Ives (1877), 85
Id. 279 in support of his opinion,
and followed Deanv. Walker (1883).
107 IlL 540.
The Indiana courts uphold the
'original creditor's action if there
is a sufficient consideration.
In Carnahan v. Tousey (1884),
'93 Ind. 561, Justice Woods states
the law as follows: "In an action
-upon a contract at law, strictly,
-privity of contract is essential to the
right of action, but'the rule in
equity is different, and by a long
line of decisions* * this court has
held that a promise of one person
to another for the benefit of a third
may be enforced in an action
brought by the latter in his own
name." To the same effect, Rodenharger v. Bramblett (I88I), 78 Id.
213. In Worley v. Sifie (I887), II
Ind. 23 8,the action wasbroughtby a
-marriedwoman against the defendant to recover a sum of money
which she alleged he had promised
to pay her. It appeared that her
"husband was the owner of land, and
sold the same to the defendant, the
consideration being a promise on
:his part to pay a certain sum of
money to the plaintiff. Chief
Justice ZOLLARS held that there
was a sufficient consideration for
the promise, namely,the release by
the plaintiff of her inchoate interast.
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The Iowa courts also allow the original creditor to sue but put him to
an election, so that a suit against
the new promisor releases the original debtor: supra, page 6oo.
In Kansas, the rule may be taken
as well settled, that third parties
not privy to a contract, nor to its
consideration, may sue upon it to
enforce any stipulation made for
theirbenefit: Antlhony v. Hlerman
(1875), 14 Kans. 494; Strong v.
Alarcy (1885). 33 Id. 109; Brenner
v. Luth (1882). 28 Id. 583; Life
Assurance Society v. Welch (i88i).
26 Id.362. The principles governing
these cases are well put by Justice
VALENTINE, in Buron v. Larkin
(1887) 36 Kan. 246, quoting the case
of Simon v. Brown (877), 66 N. Y.
355, where the following language is
used: "It is not every promise
made by one to another, from the
performance of which abenefitmay
inure to a third, which gives aright
of action to such third person, he
being neither privy to the contract
nor to the consideration. The contract must be made for his benefit
as its object, and he must be the
party intended to be benefited,
We think this a correct statement
of the law * * Of course the name
of the person to be benefited by the
contract need not be given, if he
is otherwise sufficiently described
or designated. Indeed he may be
one of a class of persons, if the class
is sufficiently described or designated. In any case where the person
to be benefited is in any manner
sufficiently described or designated,
he may sue upon the contract."
These views are supported by the
case of The Plano Manufacturing
Co. v. Burrows (1888), 40 Kans.
361; and the very recent one of
Mumper v. Kelley decided March
8, 189o (Sup. Ct. Kans)
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The Civil Code of Kentucky provides-" 18. Every action must
be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest, except as provided in Section 21."
" 21. A personalrepresentative,
guardian, curator, committee of a
person of unsound mind, trustee of
an express trust,a person with whom
or in whose name a contract is made
for thebenefit of another, a receiver appointed by a court, the assignee of a bankrupt, or a person expressly authorized by statute to do
so, may bring an action without
joining with him the person for
whose benefit it is prosecuted."
In Allen v. Thomas (I860), 3
Met. (Ky.) 198 the Court upheld
the doctrine (that the creditor might
sue), as "well settled." The case
of Smith v. Smith (1869), 3 Bush.
(Ky.) 625 also supports the rule:
there the court relied upon the
above section, and held that section
21) did
33, (Revised Code, 1888,
" not take the right from the real
party in interest to bring the suit
in his own name."
In Louisina, the cases of The
N. 0. St. Josepbh's Association v.
Magnier (i86x), 16 La. Ann. 338,
and Ferguson's Succession (1863),
17 Id. 255 ; and the Civil Code of
i87o , Art. 189o, and the Code of
practice, Art. 35, supra, page 6oi,
support the right of a third party to
sue upon the contract.
The Aaine courts proceed upon
the ground of an implied promise
and a consequent release of the
original debtor: page 599, supra.
In Maryland, the case of Coates
& Brotherv. The Penn. Fire Ins.
Co. of Philadelihia(1882), 58 Md.
172, supports the right of the third
party to bring action upon the
promise made for his benefit.
In Massachusetts, the earlier cases

would seem to lead to the conclusion that the rule of law in that
State was that such actions could
be maintained, for in Hall v. 17arston (1822), 17 Mass. 575, Chief Justice PARKER said: "It seems to
have been well settled heretofore
that if A promises B for a valuable
consideration, to pay C, the latter
may maintain assumpsit for the
money. * * The principle of
this doctrine is reasonable and consistent with the character of the
action of assnmpisit for money had
and received. There are many
cases in which that action is supported without any privity between
the parties other than what is created by law. Whenever one man has
in his hands the money of another,
which he ought to pay over, he is
liable to this action, although he
has never seen or heard of the party
who has the right. When the fact
is proved that he has the money,
if he cannot show that he has legal
or equitable ground for retaining
it, the law creates the privity and
the promise." And Justice BIGELow, in Brewer v. Dyer (1852), 7
Cush. (Mass.) 337, added that, " it
does not rest upon the ground of
any actual or supposed relationship
between the parties, as some 'f the
earlier cases would seem to indicate, nor upon the reason that the
defendant by entering into such an
agreement, has impliedly made
himself the agent of the plaintiff,
*
* but upon the broader and
more satisfactory basis, that the
law operating on the act of the parties, creates the duty, establishes a
privity and implies the promise and
obligation, on which the action is
founded." The opinion of Chief
Justice SHAW, in Carnegiev. Morrison (1841),2 Met. (Mass.) 381, also
supports this view.
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The opinions delivered in the
the more recent cases in that State
would, however, seem to be against
the right of a third party to sue
upon a contract made for his benefit, for in the case of Exchange
Bank of St. Louis v. Rice (1871),
107 Mass.-37, Justice GRAY defines
the law thus: "The general rule
of law is, that a person who is not a
party to a simple contract, and from
whom no consideration moves, cannot sue on the contract, and consequently that a promise made by one
person to another, for the benefit of
a third who is a stranger to the consideration, will not support an action by the latter. And the recent
decisions in this commonwealth and
in ]ugland have tended to uphold
the rule and to narrow the exceptions to it." He further adds that:
"The unguarded expressions of
Chief Justice SHAW in Carnegie v.
iM[orrison and of Mr. Justice BIouLow in Brewer v. Dyer, supra, to
the contrary, * * were afterwards
* *
* qualified, the limits of
the doctrine defined and a disinclination repeatedly expressed to admit
new exceptions to the general rule,
in * * Afellen v. Wkipple (1854),
i Gray (Mass.) 317; Afillard v.
Baldwin (1855), 3 Id., 484; Field
v. Crawford(1856), 6 Id. 116 ; and
Dow v. Clark (1856), 7 Id. 198.
Those judgments have since been
treated as settling the law of MassaHe
chusetts upon this subject."
further referred to Colburn v. Phillipis (1859), 13 Gray (Mass.) 64; and
Flint v. Pierce (1868), 99 Mass. 68.
Although Justice GRAY laid down
the law as above, yet he did not
overrule the exceptions stated by
Justice MFcAI.F in Mellen v.
Whipple, supra, that, "Indebitatus
assumpsit for money had and received can be maintained, in various in-

stances, where there is no actual
privity of contract between the
plaintiff and defendant, and where
the consideration does not move
from the plaintiff. In some actions
of this kind, a recovery has been
had where the promise was to a third
person for the benefit of the plaintiff; such action being an equitable one that can be supported
by showing that the defendant
has in his hands money, which,
in equity and good conscience,
belongs to the plaintiff, without
showing a direct consideration
moving from him, or a privity
of contract between him and the
defendant. * * * Cases where
promises have been made to a
father or uncle for the benefit of a
child or nephew form a second class
in which the person for whose benefit the promise was made has maintained an action for the breach of
it. The nearness of the relation between the promisee and he for whose
benefit the promise was made has
been sometimes assigned as a reason for those decisions." 3. [Cases
falling within the decision in Brewerv. Dyer (i851), 5 Cush. (lass.)
337,] "where the defendant had
the use and occupation of land
of the plaintiff, * * under a
promise, or under a legal liability
to pay rent for it."
The case of Felton v. Dickinson
(1813), 10 Mass. 287, where a
promise was made to the father for
the benefit of his son when he should
attain his majority, supports the
second exception. The Court took
the view that "although the father
contracted for the son, yet he had
a view to the son's advantage, and
not his own," and therefore held
the son entitled to recover in his
own name.
The principles set forth in Ex-
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-changeBank of St. Louis v. Rice,
supra, are followed in Carrv. National Security Bank (1871), 107
Mass. 43, -wherein the defendants
were a banking corporation, and
the firm of Lincoln and Company
-had been accustomed to deposit
money therein, and draw their
checks upon the same. Lincoln
and Company, in consideration of
$6oo paid to them by plaintiff,
drew their check upon the defendants for the like sum, payable to the
plaintiff's order, and the plaintiff
,duly presented the check and demanded payment which was refused, although the defendants had
funds in hand,against which the firm
were entitled to draw to a greater
amount. Justice GRAY here points
-out, that here there was no trust or
position ofprincipal and agent established. "The relation between the
-defindants and the drawer, as disclosed in the declaration, was simply the ordinary one of banker and
-customer, which is a relation of
-debtor and creditor, not of agent
and principal, or trustee and cestui
,que trust. * * The money deposited becomes the absolute prop.erty of the bankers, impressed with
no trust, and which they may dispose of at their pleasure, subject
-only to their personal obligation to
-the depositor to pay an equivalent
sum upon his demand, or order.
The right of the bankers to use the
money for their own benefit is the
very consideration for their promise
to the depositor. They make no
agreement with the holders of his
checks. * * * and the banker's
promise to the drawer to honor his
checks does not render them, while
still liable to account with him for
the amount of any check as part of
his general balance, liable to an action of contract by the holder also,

unless they have made a'direct
promise to the latter, by accepting
the check when presented, or otherwise." The question of the right
of the payee of a check does not,
however, fall within the purposes
of this annotation which is confined
as far as possible to the question
involved in the principal case,
namely, the right of a third person
to sue upon a contract made for his
benefit, and must therefore be reserved for future consideration. The
still more recent case of Morrill
v. Lane (1883), 136 Mass., 93, is to
the same effect. There the Court
held "that a promise made by Ato
B that A will pay unspecified
amounts of money to various persons not named, but described generally as of a certain class, will not
support an action by one of those
persons against A," no trust arising
from such a promise. See further,
as upholding the Massachusetts
doctrine, Rogers v. Union Slone Co.
(I88I), 13o Mass. 581 ; Prentice v.
Brimhall (1877), 123 Id. 291; and
Garnwell v. Pomery (1876), 121 Id.
207.
The Michigan cases would seem
to follow the English rule as it exist- at the present time. Thus in
Pipp et al. v. Reynolds et al. (1870),
20 Mich. 88, it appeared that upon
a consideration moving from one
EJcklin, the defendants promised to
perform a job of painting for the
plhintiff, which Ecklin had previously agreed with the plaintiffs to
do for them. It was not stated to
whom this promise of the defendant was made, but, generally that
by means of the premises, promises
and undertakings set Iorth in the
declaration, the defendants became
liable to pay to the plaintiffs the
money thereby sought to be recovered.
The Court held that-
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"though as between Ecklin and the
plaintiffs, the former is stated to
have undertaken to perform the
work, and as between defendants
and KRcklin, the defendants are
alleged to have promised to carry
out that agreement,and thus making
the performance of Eklin's part of
the first agreement one of the objects of the second agreement, yet
no contract relation between the
parties to this suit in respect to the
last agreement, is shown, which
could entitle the plaintiffs to recover damages for its violation by
defendants."
The case of Turner v. 1fcCarty
(1871), 22 Mich. 264, was an action
of assumfisit for work and labor
done and performed by plaintiff for
the contractor for streetpaving, the
defendant being the assignee of the
original contractor with the city,
and by the terms of the assignment
to him had agreed with the assignor
to pay all sums of money due to
persons for such labor as had been
performed by the plaintiff. Chief
Justice CA-mrnErm= declared the case
"directly within the principle of
Pipp v. Reynolds," sufira. These
cases are further supported by Hat-.
sledv. Francis(1875), 31 Mich.,112,
where plaintiff (Francis) declared
that he being the owner of a note
executed by one Rice, the defendant Halsted, in consideration of the
sale and delivery by Rice to defendant of a horse, harness andbuggy,
undertook and promised Rice to
pay the note to plaintiff (Francis)
and take up the same at maturity.
The Court held "The only contract
alleged and proved was a contract
between the defendant and Rice,
to pay the note of the latter to the
plaintiff, who was no party to that
contract, who gave no consideration
for, and was in no way bound by

it. The only consideration paid
was paid by Rice, and he was the
only party to be injured by the
breach of the contract. The plaintiff still retains the note and Rice's
liability upon it." These decisions
follow Brown v. Hlazen (1863), I
Mich. 219, and are distinguished.
from Osborn v. Osborn (1877), 36
Mich. 47, in which the plaintiff was
a creditor of the firm of Osborn, F.
& Co., composed of the defendants
0., D. & F. and held their note for
the debt. F sold out to T who
agreed to assume F's share of
the partnership liabilities.
The
new partnership paid interest
on the plaintiff's claim until dissolution, when theplaintiffsued the
new firm upon the common counts,
and also specially on the assumption by the new firm of the old
firm's debt to her, and the promise
to pay it. The circuit judge
thought the action came within
those cases already noticed, but
ChiefJustice COOrEY, drewadistinction, saying: - IIn each of those
cases, the plaintiff counted on a
promise made to a third person, not
to himself. In this case, the plaintiff counts upon a promise made to
herself. " " There is certainly evidence that the plaintiff accepted
the new firm as her debtor in place
of the old, and that she did not expect to hold F. liable further.
In iAfinnesota, a stranger to a contract and to its consideration, may
maintain an action to enforce stipulations in it made for his benefit.
Thus, in Jordan v. White (1882), 20
Minn. 91, Justice BERRY follows
the ruling in Sanders v. Clason
(i868), 13 -Minn. 379. In that case,
N. B. & C. L. Clason, beingindebted to Sanders & Co., sold and delivered to M1. B. Clason their stock
in trade upon the consideration,
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in part, of his (M. B. Clason's)
promise to pay their indebtedness to
Sanders & Co.; Justice McMILIAN,
afterremarking the great differences
in the opinions both in England
and in the United States, and citing
Farley v. Cleveland, Lawrence v.
Fox, infra, and the words of Mr.
Parsonsin his work on Contracts
(ante)says,-" Under these circumstances, in view of the authorities,
we are of opinion that the plaintiffs
can maintain this action, and that
the complainant as to this promise
states facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action."
In Mississippi,the courts uphold
the right of a third party to sue,
especially when the contract is
"adopted by him, or where he has
* * a beneficial concern and interest in the transaction :" Sweatvian v. Parker(X873), 49 Miss. 19 ;
Bonnerv. zlfarx (1875), 51. Id. 141.
The same is the law in Missouri.
In Rogers v. Gosnell (1875), 58
Mto. 589, Justice WAGINIER says,"It is now the prevailing doctrine,
that an action lies on the promise
made by a defendant upon a valid
consideration to a third person for
the benefit of a plaintiff, although
the plaintiff was not privy to the
consideration."
He cites Meverv.
Lowell (1869), 44 Mo. 328 ; Rogers
and Peak v. Gosnell (1873), 51 Id.
466 ; and Lawrence v. Fox, infra,
in support of his opinion. See also
Schuster v. Kas. City, St. Jo. &
CouncilBluffs RR. Co. (1875), 6o
Id. 290; Mosman v. Bender (1883),
8o Id. 579. From the case of Rogers el al. v. Gosnell (1873), 51 Mo.
466, it would seem that either party
might maintain theaction, for "the
courts have repeatedly held, that a
person for whose benefit a contract
is made, may sue in his own name,
-when it appears on the face of the

contract that he is the beneficiary.
This was the law before our code of
practice was adopted, and that
Code allowing a trustee to sue, has
not altered this rule." The provision of the Code referred to provide:
"Sc.
199o. Every action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest, except as otherwise provided in the next succeeding section, but this section shall
not be deemed to authorize the
assignment of a thing in action
not arising out of a contract."
AndSc. i991. "An executor or
administrator, a trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly
authorized by statute, may sue in
his own name without joining with
him the person for whose benefit
the suit is prosecuted. A trustee
of an express trust, within the
meaning of this section, shall be
construed to include a person with
whom or in whose name a contract
is made for the benefit of another."
The Code of Civil Procedure of
Montana (Comp. Stats. Id. 1887,
pp. 6o, 61) provides: "SEc. 4.
Every action shall be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest; except as otherwise provided in thisact." And " SEc. 6. An
executor or administrator, or trustee of an express trust or a person
expressly authorized by statute,
may sue without joining with him
the person or persons for whose
benefit the action is prosecuted. A
trustee of an express trust, within
the meaning of this section, shall
be construed to include a person
with whom or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of
another."
In Nebraska, the courts have followed the rule as laid down in the
principal case and the cases cited
therein, Shamp v. Meyer (1886), 20
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The Courts of New Jersey hold
Neb. 223, Chief Justice MAXWELL
saying that, "where one makes a
that one who is not a party to a conpromise to another for the benefit
tract cannot sue in respect of a
of a third person, such third person
breach of duty arising out of the
contract. They admit there is a
may maintain an action upon the
promise though the consideration
class of cases in which a person perdoes not move from him. This, we forming service or doing work under a contract maybe held in damathink, is a correct statement of the
ges for injuries to third persons,
law, and it is decisive of this case."
occasioned by negligence or misThe Code of Civil procedure of that
conduct connected with the exeState provides: "SEC. 29. Every
action must be prosecuted in the
cution of the contract, these being
name of the real party in interest,
cases where the duty or liability
arises independent of the contract :
except as otherwise provided in
Marvin Safe Co. v. Ward (1884),
Section Thirty-two. The section
17 Vr. (46 N. J. Law), 19. The
referred to relates to actions by
case of Crowell v;. Currier (1876),
trustees and others standing in a
12 C. R. Green (27 N. J. Eq.)
152,
fiduciary position.
In Nevada, such actions are al- would, however, seem to establish
lowed even, it would seem, inde- the rule, in favor of such actions on
pendently of the Statute in that
simple contracts, "as settled, in this
State, for in Miliani v. Tognini
State, for the present. But it has
(1885), 19 Nev. 133, Justice LEONnever been understood to apply to
ARD observes :-" Besides the stacontracts under seal :" Vice Chancellor who also referred to foslin v.
tute which provides that every action shall be prosecuted in the N.J. Car Spiring Co. (1873), 7 Vr.
(36 N. J. Law) 141, wherein the
name of the real party in interest,
this Court has held, in three differ- Court held such actions maintainaent cases, that the beneficiary nam- ble.
ed in such a contract may maintain
The Code of Civil procedure in
an action thereon in his own name."
New Mexico provides:
" I882.
The cases referred to are Ruhling Every action must be prosecuted in
v. Hackett (i865), 1 Nev. 360;
the name of the real party in interAlcaldav. 17orales(1867), 3 Id.132 ; est, except as provided in the next
and Bishop v. Stewart (1878), 13 Id.
section."
The theory deducible from the
25. The Statute referred to in the
above case (Gen. Stat. ed. x885, p.
New York decisions would seem to
755) provides:-'"3026. Every action
be this: that in order to give an acshall be prosecuted in the name of tion to a third party, who may derive a benefit from the performance
the real party in interest, except as
otherwise provided in this Act."
of the promise, there must be,
The courts of New Hampshire first, An intent by the promisee to
require the original creditor to be a
secure some benefit to the third
party, and, second, some privity
party to the arrangement, or to subsequently adopt and assent to it;
between the promisee and the party
to be benefited, and some obligation
substantially, they insist upon a
or duty arising from the former to
novation, a topic not within the
the latter which would give him a
scope of this article. (See page
legal or equitable claim to the bene,598, supra.)
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fit of the promise, or an equivalent
from him personally. A legal obligation or duty of the promisee to
the beneficiary will so connect him
with the transaction as to be a subtitute for any privity with the
promisor, or the consideration of
the promise; the obligation of the
promisee furnishes an evidence of
the intent of promisee to benefit
the third party, and creates a privity by substitution with the promisor. A mere stranger cannot intervene; there must be a new consideration or some prior right or
claim against one of the contractingparties.
In Farley v. Cleveland (1825), 4
Cowen (N. Y.) 432; affirmed (1827),
9 Id. 639, Farley sued Cleveland,
declaring specially, that one Moon
had given the plaintiff a promissory
note; that Cleveland, in consideration of fifteen tons of hay sold and
delivered by Moon to him, at his
instance, had promised to pay the
note of Moon to Farley. The Court
heldthat "in all these cases founded on a new and original consideration of benefit to the defendant, or
harm to the plaintiff, moving to the
party making the promise either
from the plaintiff or the original
debtor, the subsisting liability of the
original debtor is no objection to
the recovery."
The principle declared in this
case was followed in Lawrence v.
Pox (,859), 20 N. Y. 268, where one
Holly loaned to the defendant $3oo,
stating at the time that he owed
that sum to the plaintiff and had
agreed to pay it to him the then
next day ; the defendant, at the time
of receiving the money, promised
to pay it to the plaintiff. A nonsuit was moved for on three grounds,
viz: That there was no proof tending to show that Holly was indebt-
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ed to the plaintiff, that the agreement by the defendant with Holly
to pay plaintiff was void for want
of consideration, and that there was
no privity between the plaintiffand
defendant. Justice H. GRAY refused the non-suit, and said that
Farley v. Cleveland, snp-ra, "had
never been doubted as sound authority for the principle upheld by
it," and "put to rest the objection
that the defendant's promise was
void for want of consideration."
The argument from want ofprivity was met by Justice GRAY in the
following language :-" I agree that
many of the cases where a promise
was implied were cases of trusts,
created for the benefit of the promisor. * * The duty of the Trustee
to pay the cesein que trust, according to the terms of the trust, implies his promise to the latter to d(>
so. In this case, the defendant,
upon ample consideration received
from Holly, promised Holly to pay
his debt to the plaintiff; the consideration received and the promise
to Holly made it as plainly his duty
to pay the plaintiff as if the money
had been remitted to him for that
purpose, and as well implied a
promise to do so as if he had been
made a trustee of property to be
converted into cash with which to
pay. The fact that a breach of duty
imposed in the one case may be
visited, and justly, with more serious consequences than in the other
by no means disproves the payment
to be a duty in both. The principle illustrated by the example so
frequently quoted (which concisely
states the case in hand) 'that [when]
a promise [is] made to one for the
benefit of another, he for whose
benefit it is made may bring an action for its breach, has been applied,
to trust cases, not because it was ex-
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-elusively applicable to those cases,
but because it was a principle of
law, and as such applicable to those
cases."
While this was the opinion of
Justice GRAY, Chief justice JoHNSON, and his associates, DEio,
SELDEN, ALLEN and STRONG, were

of opinion that the promise was to
be regarded as made to the plaintiff
through the medium of his agent,
whose action he could ratify when
it came to his knowledge, though
-taken without his being privy thereto.
Justice COMSTOCK delivered a
dissenting opinion, wherein he
strongly upholds the principles of
Tweddle v. Atkinson, sufira, as follows: "The plaintiff had nothing
to do with the promise on which
he brought this action. It was not
made to him, nor did the consideration proceed from him. If he
can maintain the suit, it is because
an anomaly has found its way into
the law on this subject. The party
who sues upon a promise must be
the promisee, or he must have
some legal interest in the undertaking." He contended that Mellen v. Whipple,supra, was a trust
case, wherein the defendant had
money in his hands belonging to a
trust fund, which was the foundation of the duty or promise in
which the suit is brought, and that
such cases were not authorities for
the doctrine in question and did
not sustain it.
In Vrooman v. Turner (1877), 69
N. Y. 280, the action was to foreclose a mortgage on premises which
came through several wesne conveyances to one Sanborn. In none
of these did the grantee assume to
pay the mortgage, but when Sanborn conveyed to Turner the deed-contained a clause stating that the

conveyance was subject to the
mortgage, "which mortgage the
party hereto of the second part
hereby covenants and agrees to pay
off and discharge, the same forming part of the consideration thereof." The case was distinguished
from Lawrence v. Fox, sutra, the
Court saying: "The rule which
exempts tha grantee of mortgaged
premises, subject to a mortgage,
the payment of which is assumed
in consideration of the conveyance
as between him and his grantor,
from liability to the holder of the
mortgage when the grantee is not
bound in law or in equity for the
payment of the mortgage, is founded in reason and principle, and is
not inconsistent with that class of
cases in which it has been held that
a promise to one for the benefit of
a third party may avail to give
an action directly to the latter
against the promisor. * * To
give a third pftrty who may derive
a benefit from the performance of
the promise, an action, there must
be, first, an intent by the promisee
to secure some benefit to the third
party, and second, some privity between the two, the promisee and
the party to be benefited, and some
obligation or duty owing from the
former to the latter which would
give him a legal or equitable claim
to the benefit of the promise, or an
equivalent from him personally.
* * A legal obligation or duty of
the promisee to him, will so connect him with the transaction as to
be a substitute for any privity with
the promisor, or the consideration
of the promise, the obligation of
the promisee furnishes an evidence
of the intent of the latter to benefit
him, and creating a privity by substitution with the promisor. A
mere stranger cannot intervene,
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and claim by action the benefit of
a dontract betveen other parties.
There must be either a new consideration or some prior right or claim
against one of the contracting parties, by which he has a legal interest in the performance of the agreement."
The more recent case of Todd v.

Weber (1884), 95 N. Y. I8r, takes
the doctrine as well settled that the
right of a third party to maintain
assum/psiton a promise, not under
seal, made to another for his benefit, as now the prevailing rule in
this country.
A case has very recently been
brought before the Court of Appeals of New York in which the
sufficiency of consideration was
again raised.
From the facts it
would appear that the defendant
was the executor of one Wn.'ght, and
that the testator's brother, who was
his heir at law and nest of kin, contested the probate. A compromise
was made between the executor
(the defendant in the present action) and the brother of the testator,
that the objection should be withdrawn in consideration of the defendant's paying the plaintiff in the
present action, a certain sum.
The agreement was reduced into
writing and read as follows: "For
value received, I hereby promise to
pay to Saint Mark's Church, New
Castle, Westchester County, the
sum of five hundred dollars. It is
understood that said Church will
appropriate the interest of said
money to the improvement, adornment, and care-taking of the churchyard of said church: but the payment thereof shall not be exacted
till the decease of Thomas Wright
[the brother]. It is further understood that upon the execution and

delivery, by the residuary legatees
named in the will of Lewis Wright
[the testator], of a written agreement or of a sufficient promise to
bind thenTi, instead of the undersigned, to the above, then this writing shall be destroyed, or delivered
to theundersigned, Chas. G. Teed."
After giving the definition of consideration as in Currie v. Misa
(1875), L. R., 1o Ex. 162,as follows:
"A valuable consideration in the
sense of the law, may consist either
in some right, interest, profit or
benefit accruing to the one party,
or some forebearance, detriment,
loss or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other,"
the Court proceeds: "It is not
essential that the person to whom
the consideration moves should be
benefited, provided the person from
whom it moves is, in a legal sense,
injured. The injury may consist of
a compromise of a disputed claim,
or forbearance to exercise a legal
right; the alteration in position being regarded as a detriment that
forms a consideration, independent
of the actual value of the right forborne. * * As recently held by this
Court, [Todd v. Weber, supra,] after
a careful review of the authorities,
a party for whose benefit a promise
is made, may sue in assumfisitthereon even if the consideration thereof
arose between the promisor and a
third person." Rector etc. of St.
Mark's Chturclh v. Teed, Ct. of Appl., N. Y., June 24, 189o.
In North Carolina, the courts
uphold the doctrine, it would seem,
only, upon the ground of money
had and received to the plaintiff's
use: Draughan.v. Bunting (1848),
9 Ired. (N. C.) IO ; Hallv. Robinson (1847), 8 Id. 56; and the more
recent case of Peacock v. Williams,
supra,pages 606-7, while noticing

GRANT V. DIEBOLD SAFE AND LOCK CO.

the want of privity, confirms the
above.
The Ohio courts recognize this
right of action in the original creditor. In Trimble v. Slrother (1874),
25 Ohio St. 378,JusticeWHirr, said
"We do not question the former
rulings of this Court, that a party
may maintain an action on a
promise made for his benefit, although the consideration moved
from another, to whom the promise was made. But this rule must
be understood and applied with its
proper qualifications."
He cited
Bagaleyv. Waters (1857), 7 Ohio
St. 359 ; Miller & Co. v. Florer
(i864), 15 Ohio St. 151; Brewer v.
Dyerand Millen v. Whipple, suipra,
and Thompson v. Thompson (1854),
4 Ohio St. 333, wherein Chief
Justice THuRmAw says:-"It is
well settled that if one person
makes a promise to another for the
benefit of a third person, that third
person may maintain an action at
law on that promise."
The Oregon Code of Civil Procedure provides: " 27. every
action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest,
except as otherwise provided in
Section 29, but this section shall
not be deemed to authorize the assignment of a thing in action not
arising out of contract." And 29:
" An executor or administrator,
a trustee of an 6xpress trust, or a
person expressly authorized by
statute, may sue without joining
with him the person for whose benefitthe action is prosecuted. A person with whom or in whose name a
contract is made for the benefit of
another, is a trustee of an express
trust within the meaning of this
section."
Hence, a person for
whose benefit a promise is made
:being the party beneficially interest-

ed, the real party in interest, may
bring suit thereon in his own name:
Holladay v. Davis (1873), 5 Or.
43 ; Baker & Smith v. Eglin (1883),
II Id. 333; even though the contract be under seal: Hughes v. Oregon Railway and Nay. Co. (1884),
ii Id. 437 ; Schneider v. While
(1885), 12 Id. 5o3.
The Pennsylvaniacases show the
rule in that State to be, that where
A promises B to pay B's debt to C
out of funds placed in his hands by
B, the case does not fall within the
statute of Frauds, and therefore
"the promise is not simply to pay
the debt of another, but to hand
over funds appropriated by the
debtor himself to the creditor for
whose use he deposits them. In
such case, the creditor, though not
present, is the party to be benefited,
and becomes the owner of the fund
thus impressed with a trust for him
and can sue for it: " Justice v.
Tallman (1878), 86 Pa. 147. Chief
Justice MEICUR, in Townsend v.
Long (1875), 77 Pa. 143, thus states
the law upon this point: " Where
there is a transfer of a fund to the
promisor, for the payment of the
debt * * he is liable to the creditor
on his verbal promise made to the
owner of the fund; or if property
charged with the payment of the
debt be transferred to him, on his
promise to the vendor to pay the
debt, he is liable to an action by
the creditor." In other cases it
would seem, that in order to entitle the third party to sue upon the
contract, he must have become a
party to, or adopted, the new
agreement: sup ra, pages 6o5-6.
The Rhode Island -courts hold
that the contract is not within the
statute of Frauds, and generally uphold the third party's right to sue:
supra,page 602.
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The Code of Civil Procedure of
South Carolina provides: "SecTION 132. Every action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest, except as otherwise provided in SECTION 134; but
this section shall not be deemed to
authorize the assignment of a thing
in action not arising out of contract.
But an action may be maintained
by a grantee of land in the name
of the grantor, or his or her heirs
or legal representatives, when the
grant or grants are void by reason
of the actual possession of a person
claiming under a title adverse to
that of the grantor at the time of
the delivery of the grant, and the
plaintiff shall be allowed to prove
the facts to bring the case within
this provision." And the case of
Brown v. O'Brien (1845), 1 Rich.
(S. C.) 268, supports the third
party's right to sue. Thomfison v.
Gordon (1848), 3 Strobh..(S. C.) 196.
The Tennessee courts support the
right upon the equitable doctrine
that allows an original vendor to
proceed either against the estate,
or against the purchase money in
the hands of the sub-purchaser. It
looks upon the action of assumpsit
in such cases as being an equitable
one, entitling the party to recover
that which he equitably ought to
have: supra, pages 6o3-4.
The Texas courts uphold the
doctrine that if a party received
money from A to pay to B, the latter may maintain a suit against
him for it. And if one, for sufficient consideration, undertake to
pay a debt due toanotherby a third
party, such undertaking is not
within the statute of Frauds: Monroe v. Buchanan (1863), 27 Tex.
247.
The real party in interest
must sue:
Tlwmpson v. Cartwright (1846), 1 Tex. 87.

The compiled laws of Utah (ed1876, p. 492) provide: "SEcTrON 4Every action shall be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in
interest, except as otherwise provided in this act."
The Vermont courts hold that ifA receives property from B to convert into money, under a promise
to pay the debt due from B to C,
and converts such property into
money, C may sue in his own name
for his debt; but where the contract
is special, or to the extent that it is
special, it can only be sued in the
name of the party with whom it is
made, and from whom the consideration moves: that after the
money is realized it becomes absolutely the money of the plaintiff
in the defendant's hands, and the
law implies a promise directly from
A to C: Phelps, Dodge & Co. v.
Conant & Co. (1858), 30 Vt. 277;
Craniplonv. Ballard (1838), IoId.
251.
The Code of Civil Procedure of
Washington provides: " SECTIoN
4. Every action shall be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest, except as is otherwise provided by law."
In West Virginia, Chap. 71 of
the code provides: "2. An immediate estate or interest in, or the
benefit of a condition respecting
any estate, may be taken by a person under an instrument, although
he be not a party thereto ; and if a
covenant or promise be made, for
the sole benefit of a person with
whom it is not made, or with whom
it is made jointly with others, such
person may maintain in his own
name, any action thereon which he
might maintain in case it had been
made with him only, and the consideration had moved from him to
the party making such covenant or

